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WASHINGTON
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME II. FEBRUARY, 1927 NUMBER 2
THE UNIFORM SALES ACT IN THE STATE OF
WASHINGTON
The Uniform Sales Act was enacted by the State of Washington
at the extraordinary session of its legislature' convened November 9,
1925, and adjourned January 7, 1926. Under constitutional provi-
sion 2 this law went into effect ninety days after the adjournment of
the session at which it was enacted. Prior to this time the Uniform
Sales Act had been enacted in Arizona, Connecticut and New Jersey
in 1907, Massachusetts, Ohio and Rhode Island in 1908, Maryland
in 1910; New York and Wisconsin in 1911, Alaska and Michigan
in 1913, Illinois, Nevada and Pennsylvania in 1915, Minnesota,
North Dakota, Utah and Wyoming in 1917, Idaho, Iowa, Oregon,
and Tennessee in 1919; Nebraska, South Dakota and Vermont in
1921, and, Maine and New Hampshire in 1923, a total of twenty-
seven jurisdictions. Prior to these enactments, the Sale of Goods Act,
which forms the basis of the Uniform Sales Act, had been adopted in
England in 1894. That act has since been adopted in most of the
Canadian jurisdictions and in the British dominions. It was adopted
in British Columbia in 1897 and in the Northwest Territories of
Canada (then including Alberta and Saskatchewan) in 1898.
The advantages of uniformity of legislation in matters pertaining
to commercial subjects seems so obvious as to require but slight com-
ment. In laws relating to commercial subjects, conditions and prob-
lems are rarely of a local nature, and in view of the great amount of
trading which exists between the several states, it cannot help but
add to the convenience and advantage of those engaged in commercial
Laws 1925, Ext. Sess., ch. 142.
Const. Art. 2, § 31.
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ventures that the laws so far as possible be the same. While there
may be some slight inconvenience occasioned by the adjustment which
accompanies any change of the law, the changes occasioned by reason
of the adoption of the Uniform Acts are usually minor, and in the
case of the Sales Act have to some extent been anticipated by the prior
adoption of the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Act, the Uniform
Warehouse Receipts Act, and the Uniform Bills of Lading Act.
None of the Uniform Commercial Acts have been drafted with
greater care than the Sales Act. It is based upon the Sale of Goods
Act, which was largely a codification of the then existing law of
sales. This act has been in force in England since 1894, and the
draftsman of the American Act accordingly could look not only to
the English Act but also to the experience of England for about ten
years in operation under the English Act. The first tentative draft
of the Sales Act, prepared in 1902-03, by Professor Samuel Williston,
was submitted with revision and amendments to the Commissioners
of Uniform Laws in national conference each year until its final
adoption by that body in 1906, and was, in 1907, given the approval
of the American Bar Association.
The Sales Act is largely a codification of the existing law of sales
and will, therefore, not usually affect the prior law of the jurisdic-
tions in which adopted. Where there is a division of authority the
sections of the Act usually state the prevailing or majority rule. It
is to be noted, however, that in such instances as the commissioners
deemed another rule to be better, either from the standpoint of legal
principle or business convenience the same was adopted. As the Act
can at most be but an outline or statement of the general principles
of the law of sales, it will doubtless receive different constructions in
the several jurisdictions, and unquestionably in time will need a revi-
sion. However, as section 74 of the Act s provides that "This Act
shall be so interpreted and construed as to effectuate its general pur-
pose to make uniform the laws of those states which enact it," it is
likely that such deviation as develops will be limited to rather im-
material matters. In any event, so far as a revision will be necessi-
tated, it will be a great advantage to have the courts in the many
jurisdictions passing upon the same provisions, as it will tend more
quickly to thoroughly establish the law
In the following treatment the sections of the Act as adopted in
Washington will each be considered in turn. No attempt has been
'Laws 1925, Ext. Sess., ch. 14-, p. 388.
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made to exhaust the authorities in the State of Washington or else-
where. 4
Occasional comment is made where the sections merely codify or
correspond with the existing law. A more detailed consideration is
given with occasional analysis of the cases where there is a conflict
in authority or where the law differs from that expressed in the Act.
The Act itself is analyzed in the few instances where there might
be a difference of opinion as to its interpretation and application. In
this way it is hoped that these articles will be of assistance in accom-
plishing the adjustment to the Act necessitated in the few instances
in which it changes the law of sales heretofore existing in the State
of Washington.
UNIFORM SALES ACT
FORMATION OF THE CONTRACT
See. 1. Contracts to Sell and Sales.
(1) A contract to sell goods is a contract whereby the seller agrees
to transfer the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration
called the price.
(2) A sale of goods is an agreement whereby the seller transfers
the property in goods to the buyer for a consideration called the price.
(3) A contract to sell or a sale may be absolute or conditional.
(4) There may be a contract to sell or a sale between one part
owner and another.
The definitions given in this section are necessary to an understand-
ing of the Act. The distinction between "contract to sell" and "sale"
if fundamental and vital, for in the case of a contract to sell, there
being no transfer of title, property, or ownership, the rights of the
parties are necessarily discussed from the standpoint of contract; while
in the case of a sale the transfer of property having taken place, the
rights of the parties are discussed from the standpoint of property.
There has been some confusion in the use of the terms "executory"
and "executed" as applied to sales. The suggested usage is not too
technical and it should be remembered that accuracy in the use and
meaning of terms is most conducive to clear thinking. The use of
these terms is not inconsistent with the present state of the law except
4 For a scholarly treatise on the law of sales at common law and under the
Uniform Sales Act, with elaborate citations, see WmLmSTOir oW SALES, (2 ed.,
1924), and for authorities since its adoption see U~NroRx LAws, AgwOTAToD--
Uxrrou SAhiS AcT wr=s AxxvAL Su-PpL-rrr, published b7 the Edward
Thompson Company.
WASHINGTON LAW REVIEW
that it must be borne in mind that these terms have heretofore been
used indiscriminately, their meaning being left to determination largely
from context and the circumstances under which used.
Subsections (3) and (4) simply restate the existing law
Sec. 2. Capacity Liabilities for Necessaries.
Capacity to buy and sell is regulated by the general law concerning
capacity to contract, and to transfer and acquire property.
Where necessaries are sold and delivered to an infant, or to a person
who by reason of mental incapacity or drunkenness is incompetent to
contract, he must pay a reasonable price therefor
Necessaries in this section means goods suitable to the condition in
life of such infant or other person, and to his actual requirements at
the time of delivery.
The capacity to contract or buy and sell is determined by the law
of the place of the contract in accordance with the general rule that
the validity of a contract and its construction are determined by that
law
The first paragraph merely states that the law of a state prevails
as to capacity both as to contract and the transfer and acquisition of
property While not necessary to discuss the subject of capacity in
detail here, it may be noted that by the Session Laws of 1923,
Chapter 72, both males and females become of legal age at twenty-one
years, Washington thus returning to the age which has been fixed by
law for centuries. It has been suggested that in Washington the mar-
riage of either a man or woman under the age of twenty-one years has
the effect not only of emancipation, but of giving full contractual
capacity (See Williston, Sales (2d ed. 1924) §10b, and note to same
which cites In re Hollopeter 52 Wash. 41, 100 Pac. 159 (1909) That
case, however, held merely that the husband although under legal age
was entitled to maintain an action in his own name to secure the custody
and society of his wife and the later case of Morgan v. Cunningham,5
holds that while a minor son is emancipated by marriage it does not
remove civil disability The capacity of married women is, of course,
subject to the law of community property so far as applicable.
The second paragraph fixing the liability for necessaries at a reason-
able price states the prevailing law While Rem. Comp. Stat. §5829
provides that "A minor is bound, not only by his contract for neces-
saries,-", this must have been intended to refer to quasi-contractual
relations rather than the contract actually made. This was not so
5 109 Wash. 105, 186 Pae. 309 (1919).
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held in Plummer v. Northern Pacific R. Co., 6 wherein Justice Chad-
wick says, at page 70 "Even if we regard the legal services of ap-
pellants as necessaries, it does not follow that the contract made with
them is binding. The correct rule is stated in 14 Ruling Case Law,
page 255, 'It is, however, inaccurate, strictly speaking, to say that the
infant's contract, if for necessaries, is valid and binding upon him.
The more accurate statement is that he is liable to pay the reasonable
value of such necessaries as he has purchased or received, or, as it is
sometimes expressed, he is liable on an implied contract, but not on
the express contract which he has made.' "
As to what constitutes necessaries, the rule stated is that which gen-
erally prevails.
FORMALITIES OF THE CONTRACT
Sec. 3. Form of Contract or Sale.
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that behalf,
a contract to sell or a sale may be made in writing (either with or
without seal), or by word of mouth, or partly in writing and partly by
word of mouth, or may be inferred from the conduct of the parties.
This section states an obvious rule of the common law Aside from
the Statutes of Fraud the only importance of a writing in a contract
to sell or of sale is that it furnishes evidence which cannot be varied
by parol.
Sec. 4. Statute of Fraud.
(1) A contract to sell or a sale of any goods or choses in action
exceeding the value of $50 shall not be enforceable by action unless the
buyer shall accept part of the goods or choses in action so contracted
to be sold or sold, and actually receive the same, or give something in
earnest to bind the contract, or in part payment. or unless some note
or memorandum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the
party to be charged or his agent in that behalf.
(2) The provisions of this section apply to every such contract or
sale, notwithstanding that the goods may be intended to be delivered
at some future time or may not at the time of such contract or sale be
actually made, procured or provided, or fit or ready for delivery, or
some act may be requisite for the making or completing thereof, or
rendering the same fit for delivery; but if the goods are to be manu-
factured by the seller especially for the buyer and are not suitable for
sale to others in the ordinary course of the seller's business, the provi-
sions of this section shall not apply.
(3) There is an acceptance of goods within the meaning of this
section when the buyer, either before or after delivery of the goods,
expresses by words or conduct his assent to becoming the owner of
those specific goods.
6 98 Wash. 67, 167 Pac. 73 (1917).
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The Uniform Sales Act as adopted in Washington provides that
"Section 5826 of Remington's Compiled Statutes is hereby repealed."
This section reads as follows:
Section 5826. Contract for Sale of Goods Void When. No
contract for the sale of any goods, wares, or merchandise, for
the price of fifty dollars, or more, shall be good and valid,
unless the purchaser shall accept and receive part of the goods
so sold, or shall give something in earnest to bind the bargain,
or in part payment, or unless some note or memorandum in
writing of the bargain be made and signed by the party to be
charged thereby, or by some person thereunto by him lawfully
authorized."
While the form and wording of section 5826 and the section of the
Uniform Act are at great variance, the substance of the two sections
is substantially the same, the main effect of the Uniform Act being
to give a more accurate and explicit statement of the law as expressed
by the weight of authority and as it exists in the State of Washington.
The changes and reasons for the same will appear in the following
analysis:
"A contract to sell or a sale" definitely shows that the sale applies
to executory contracts to sell goods as well as to sales. "Contracts
for the sale" is ambiguous but was always construed to mean either a
contract to sell or a sale.
The term "goods" as defined in the Uniform Sales Act is as wide
in its meaning as the several words "goods, wares, or merchandise"
The most troublesome question in any attempt to define the meaning
of the word "goods" relates to the dividing line between real and
personal property. As to the sale of standing trees the courts of most
of the American states that have considered the question have held
that a sale of growing or standing timber is a contract concerning an
interest in land. The Sales Act copies the definition of "goods" so
far as concerns this question8  from the English statute, and
adopts the English rule that any growing object attached to the soil
is to be treated as goods, if by the terms of the contract it is to be
immediately severed.9
The term "choses in action" has been added. This is not included
within the term "goods, wares, and merchandise," but in the United
-Laws 19-5, Ext. Sess., ch. 142, § 77.
'Laws, 1925, Ext. Sess., ch. 142, § 76.
o See remarks pertaining to this point in Sommers Company v. Piz, 75
Wash. .233, 134 Pac. 932 (1913) the case of the sale of a small house; In re
Bloor's Bstate, 115 Wash. 507, 197 Pac. 614 (1921) may be similarly analyzed.
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States choses in action evidenced by tangible documents such as cer-
tificates, of stock have generally been recognized as being included
within the statute. 0 The statute has, however, rarely been extended
beyond securities which have a visible and tangible form. As there
is just as much reason for supporting the transfer of intangible prop-
erty by written evidence as the transfer of visible property, the Sales
Act expressly includes choses in action.
The use of the word "value" instead of the word "price" is more
precise, as it covers contracts of barter which have always been inter-
preted to be within the terms of the statute. The Act as adopted by
the Commissioners fixes the amount at $500 and the majority of the
states have adopted this amount. Washington follows a number of
states in adopting the amount as $50.11 Others vary from sales irre-
spective of value, to the amount fixed in Ohio at $2500.
The words "shall not be enforceable by action" more accurately
express the effect of non-compliance with the statute. In Rem. Comp.
Stat. §5826 the title includes the term "void" and the section
itself reads "No contract shall be good and valid." As it is
generally held that the statute affects only the enforceability and not
the validity of a bargain, the use of such terms as "void" and "not
valid" are obviously confusing as well as inaccurate.
The methods of satisfying the statute, although slightly different in
wording, are the same. While occasionally the word "delivery," and
even the word "acceptance," is used as the equivalent of acceptance
and actual receipt, it is clear that acceptance and actual receipt are
imposed by the statute as a double requirement. Further, it may be
noted that receipt may precede acceptance or that acceptance may
precede receipt.' 2  At the present day earnest money as distin-
gmshed from part payment is seldom or never given. It would, per-
haps, still be binding, but as distinguished from part payment is now
of little practical importance. Part payment does not require payment
in money. Even the discharge of a prior debt will be sufficient pro-
vided there is evidence of the discharge. A detriment incurred in
reliance on the oral contract, but not part of the price, is obviously
insufficient either as part payment or as earnest. Interesting cases
to this effect are found in Hewson v. Peterman Mfg. Co.,' s where
lo Hewson v. Peterman Mfg. Co., 76 Wash. 600, 136 Pac. 1158 (1913), Cole-
man v. St. Paul ck Tacoma Lumber Co., 110 Wash. 259, 188 Pae. 532 (192o0).
""Laws 1925, Ext. Sess., ch. 142, p. 356.
12 Hosmer v. McDonnell, 114 Wash. 489, 195 Pae. 231 (191).
1 Note 10, supra.
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the plaintiff's having given up his position to go to work for
the defendant was held not earnest or part payment- and Coleman v.
St. Paul & Tacoma Lumber Go., 14 where it was held that the
payment of expenses in exploring property was not the giving of some-
thing in earnest. As to the note or memorandum, and the signature
of the party to be charged or his agent, the decisions in Washington
generally express the views prevailing in other jurisdictions.
Subsection (2) definitely states the line of demarcation between
contracts for work and labor and contracts for the sale of goods. The
original statute left room for three different interpretations, which
gave rise to three different views designated as the English, the Massa-
chusetts, and the New York rules. The English rule was perhaps
the more logical in basing the test upon whether the parties intended
ultimately to pass the title to a chattel. The New York rule drew
the distinction between goods to be manufactured which were treated
as not within the statute and goods already in existence, which were
held within the statute. The Massachusetts rule made no distinction
as to whether or not the chattel was then existing but particularlv
considered whether the article was made in the usual course of busi-
ness or made specially for the buyer- in the former case it was
deemed a contract for a sale, and in the latter case a contract for
work and labor. The Sales Act is an adoption of the Massachusetts
rule, which was the one most commonly adopted prior to the Uniform
Sales Act. The State of Washington early recognized the Massachu-
setts rule.15
Subsection (3) makes the test of acceptance a willingness to take
the particular goods. Some jurisdictions had held that mere words
were not sufficient to constitute an acceptance. This section makes it
clear that either words or conduct are sufficient and also makes it
clear that the acceptance may be either before or after the delivery of
the goods.
SUBJECT MATTER OF CONTRACT
Sec. 5. Existing and Future Goods.
(1) The goods which form the subject of a contract to sell may
be either existing goods, owned or possessed by the seller, or goods to
be manufactured or acquired by the seller after the making of the con-
tract to sell, in this act called "future goods."
(2) There may be a contract to sell goods, the acquisition of which
14 Note 10, supra.
i5 See Pu get Sound Iron Co. v. Worthington, 2 Wash. Terr. 472, 7 Par.
882 (1885) Fo.x v. Utter 6 Wash. 299, 33 Pac. 354 (1893) Puget Sound Ma-
chtnery Depot v. Rigby, 13 Wash. 264, 43 Pac. 39 (1895).
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by the seller depends upon a contingency which may or may not
happen.
(3) Where the parties purport to effect a present sale of future
goods, the agreement operates as a contract to sell the goods.
Undoubtedly, the seller could at common law contract to sell goods
which he did not own. Contracts by a manufacturer for the sale of
his future product and contracts by dealers who expect later to acquire
the subject-matter of their contracts, are common illustrations. The
only question raised in the law has been the one of public policy relat-
ing to contracts of speculation. These have been determined as against
public policy only when they are in effect pure wagers as to price.
There is nothing in the wording of this section to permit or make
legal wagering contracts. The same may be said for subsection (2).
The seller and buyer may make a contract which purports to be a
present sale of goods which in fact the seller does not own. Obviously,
there can be no transfer of title, but the question at once presents
itself-what is the effect of such an agreement? It might be sug-
gested that it being impossible to pass title, no effect should be given
to such a contract; but the more reasonable interpretation would be
that the parties intended some effect, and the Sales Act has accord-
ingly declared this agreement to operate as a contract to sell the goods.
An exception should be noted, however, in the case where only the
seller knows that he has no present title to transfer. In such a case
the seller would be estopped from asserting his title upon later acquisi-
tion of the goods purported to be sold. In effect, at least as between
the parties, the title would pass with no further act of appropriation
as would be required in the event it were treated as a mere contract
to sell.
The anomalous doctrine of potential possession or potential existence
existed under the common law to the effect that in some instances the
equivalent of a present sale could be effected although the seller did
not then possess the goods or the goods were not in existence. These
cases were restricted to future increase from the root, stem, or stock
then owned by the seller and the doctrine found its application for
the most part in the cases of crops and the offspring or natural prod-
ucts of animals. This doctrine although seldom applied has been rec-
ognized in many American jurisdictions. For instance, in North
Idaho Grain Company v. Callison,16 Justice Chadwick states: "This
being so, all authorities concur in laying down the rule-that there can
16 83 Wash. 210, 219, 145 Pac. 23- (1915).
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be no valid executed sale unless the thing sold has either an actual or
potential existence at the time of the sale. That is to say, it must
actually exist and be in the possession or under the control of the
vendor, or it must come out of something that is in his possession or
under his control, as for instance, growing crops, goods in the process
of manufacture, the increase of cattle and the like." While this is
rather unusual in including "goods in the process of manufacture," it
in general recognizes the existence of the doctrine. The doctrine is
more commonly recognized in cases of chattel mortgages, which cases
are, however, capable of being explained on an equitable doctrine and
are often provided for by statute. (In Washington, Rem. Comp.
Stat. §3779 provides that mortgages may be made upon growing
crops provided such crops are sowed or planted within one year from
the execution of the mortgage.) In so far as the doctrine is recognized
in the cases of chattel mortgages it will not be affected, since the
Sales Act expressly provides in section 75 that its provisions are not
applicable to mortgages.
As subsection (3) provides that the effect of a present sale of future
goods is to operate as a contract to sell and no exception is made m
favor of goods of which the seller has the potential possession it may
be assumed that the adoption of the Uniform Sales Act does away with
this doctrine. In view of the many objections to the doctrine in
rendering titles uncertain so far as third parties are concerned, this
seems most desirable. As stated by the draughtsman of the English
Sale of Goods Act, "there is no rational distinction between one class
of future goods and another."'1
Sec. 6. Undivided Shares.
(1) There may be a contract to sell or a sale of an undivided share
of goods. If the parties intend to effect a present sale, the buyer, by
force of the agreement, becomes an owner in common with the owner
or owners of the remaining shares.
(2) In the case of fungible goods, there may be a sale of an undi-
vided share of a specific mass, though the seller purports to sell and
the buyer to buy a definite number, weight or measure of the goods in
the mass, and though the number, weight or measure of the goods In
the mass is undetermined. By such a sale the buyer becomes owner
in common of such a share of the mass as the number, weight or
measure bought bears to the number, weight or measure of the mass.
If the mass contains less than the number, weight or measure bought,
the buyer becomes the owner of the whole mass, and the seller is
17 CHAaZiEus, SALE or GooDs AcT (5 ed., 1894) 19.
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bound to make good the deficiency from similar goods unless a con-
trary intent appears.
Subsection (1) states a well recognized rule in all jurisdictions.
Subsection (2) follows the doctrine of Kimberly v. Patchin. s
This does not represent the law of England and is contrary to a large
minority group of the American jurisdictions.
The difference between the two views lies in the interpretation or
construction of the transaction. It is a well recognized rule of law,
as well as of logic, that no title can pass to unidentified or unascer-
tamed goods. When the seller purports to sell a definite number of
goods in a definite mass as provided by subsection (2), the English
courts construe this to be an attempt to sell specific goods before they
are ascertained, and, therefore, that it is impossible to do so. As
it is impossible to determine these goods specifically until an appropria-
tion is made, no title can pass to any specific goods and, therefore, no
title does pass. The construction given by the courts of the United
States, however, is in accord more with the parties' intent than with a
literal construction of the words used. If in these cases it is clear
that the parties have attempted to pass title as, for instance, where the
seller has been paid and acknowledges that he holds the goods for
the buyer, it seems quite plausible that the parties contemplate that the
buyer instead of becoming the owner of any specific goods shall rather
become the owner of a portion of the goods; in other words, he be-
comes a tenant in common owning a share of the mass measured by
the amount sold compared to the entire mass.
It should be observed that this rule applies only to cases of fungible
goods, that is, goods comprised of units each of which is deemed by
the parties in the particular transaction to be of equal value to the
other. Moreover, the fundamental rule that title to personal property
passes according to intention controls; accordingly, the rule is not
called into play until the intention to pass title is manifest. In the
case of Anderson v. Crisp,19 the doctrine of Kimberly v. Patchin, supra
was urged, but not applied, as Justice Dunbar felt that the subject-
matter was not strictly fungible and something further remained to be
done. In the later case of Mayer v. Gibson,20 the goods being fungible
and the intention dear, the doctrine of Kimberly v. Patchin, supra,
was expressly approved.
18 19 N. Y. 330 (1859).
19 5 Wash. 178, 31 Pac. 638 (189.).
20 114 Wash. 394, 195 Pac. 1 (1921).
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Cases which involve a selection of a portion of the mass must be
carefully distinguished. That there is to be a selection, necessarily
implies that the contents of the mass are regarded by the parties as
differing in value and it would be a direct violation of the terms of
such a bargain to say that it was in effect an agreement to create
a tenancy in common in the mass. If specific goods are to be selected,
it might be urged that there is a sale of specific goods, even so, the
property would not pass until the separation is made. This would be
overcome ordinarily by delivery to the buyer, but if the terms of the
bargain were not sufficient to enable any competent person to deter-
mine to what parts of the mass the bargain related, it would seem
impossible for the property to pass until the separation was made.2 1
Sec. 7 Destruction of Goods Sold.
(1) Where the parties purport to sell specific goods, and the goods
without the knowledge of the seller have wholly perished at the time
when the agreement is made, the agreement is void.
(2) Where the parties purport to sell specific goods, and the goods
without the knowledge of the seller have perished in part or have
wholly or in a material part so deteriorated in quality as to be substan-
tially changed in character the buyer may at his option treat the sale:
(a) As avoided; or
(b) As transferring the property in all of the existing goods or in
so much thereof as have not deteriorated, and as binding the buyer to
pay the full agreed price if the sale was indivisible, or to pay the
agreed price for the goods in which the property passes if the sale was
divisible.
This section expresses the existing law Subsection (1) is some-
times put upon the ground of impossibility, sometimes upon the ground
of mistake, and sometimes upon the ground of lack of mutual assent.
Subsection (2) provides for the case of deterioration or partial de-
struction of the goods when unknown to the parties at the time they
enter into the sale.
Sec. 8. Destruction of Goods Contracted to Be Sold.
(1) Where there is a contract to sell specific goods, and subse-
quently, but before the risk passes to the buyer without any fault on
the part of the seller or the buyer, the goods wholly perish, the contract
is thereby avoided.
(2) Where there is a contract to sell specific goods, and subse-
quently, but before the risk passes to the buyer, without any fault of
the seller or the buyer, part of the goods perish or the whole or a ma-
21 See Lauber v. Johnson, 54 Wash. 59, 102 Pac. 873 (1909).
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terial part of the goods so deteriorate in quality as to be substantially
changed in character, the buyer may at his option treat the contract:
(a) As avoided; or
(b) As binding the seller to transfer the property in all of the ex-
isting goods or in so much thereof as have not deteriorated, and as
binding the buyer to pay the full agreed price if the contract was In-
divisible, or to pay the agreed price for so much of the goods as the
seller, by the buyer's option, is bound to transfer if the contract was
divisible.
This section is also believed to express the existing law. Subsection
(1) is a well recognized principle of the law of contracts. Subsec-
tion (2) (a) is also a well recognized principle in the law of con-
tracts, and subsection (2) (b) is merely an application to the law of
sales of the general doctrine of election.
THE PRICE
Sec. 9. Definition and Ascertainment of Price.
(1) The price may be fixed by the contract, or may be left to be
fixed in such manner as may be agreed, or it may be determined by the
course of dealings between the parties.
(2) The price may be made payable in any personal property.
(3) Where transferring or promising to transfer any interest in real
estate constitutes the whole or part of the consideration for trans-
ferring or for promising to transfer the property in goods, this act shall
not apply.
(4) Where the price is not determined in accordance with the fore-
going provisions the buyer must pay a reasonable price. What is a
reasonable price is a question of fact dependent on the circumstances of
each particular case.
Subsection (1) states a principle obvious under the law of con-
tracts and is based on section 8 of the English Act.
Subsection (2) provides that barters shall be covered by the Act.
It would seem unfortunate in codifying the law of sales to exclude
contracts of exchange which turn on precisely the same principle. Ex-
changes have always been held within the section of the Statute of
Frauds relating to the sale of goods and in the construction of other
statutes the word "sale" usually includes transactions other than for a
money price. On the other hand, different principles are often appli-
cable where a bargain concerns real estate, and these cases are, there-
fore, expressly excluded by subsection (3)
Subsection (4) is in accord with well recognized principles.
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Sec. 10. Sale at a Valuation.
(1) Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods at a price
or on terms to be fixed by a third person, and such third person
without fault of the seller or the buyer cannot or does not fix the price
or terms, the contract or the sale is thereby avoided; but if the goods
or any part thereof have been delivered to and appropriated by the
buyer he must pay a reasonable price therefor.
(2) Where such third person is prevented from fixing the price or
terms by fault of the seller or the buyer, the party not in fault may
have such remedies against the party in fault as are allowed by parts
IV and V of this act.
This section states the general law It is for the parties to make
their own bargain, and if they never have arrived at an agreement as
to an essential term, there should be no obligation on either side. If
the buyer has actually appropriated the goods without the value being
fixed, the law will construct the contract. The interesting question
will arise as to how far the valuation is conclusive upon the parties.
The prevailing rule is that in the absence of mistake or fraud, the
price fixed by agreed valuers is conclusive upon the parties. The
question presented is analogous to the cases of the engineer's or archi-
tect's certificate. In Washington, the Court apparently exercises a
somewhat liberal right to revise the conclusion of the architect or
engineer. See Taft v. Whitney Go., 22 wherein Justice Main says:
"The rule of these decisions is, that where construction
work is to be done to the satisfaction of a third party, such
as an architect, the judgment of such third party either in
approving or condemning the work, must be exercised in an
honest and independent manner and not in an arbitrary or
fraudulent manner. If the approval or condemnation of the
work is arbitrary, it amounts to a constructive fraud."
This probably reflects the view that the Court will take in the case
in question should the same arise.
CONDITIONS AND WARRANTIES
Sec. 11. Effect of Conditions.
(1) Where the obligation of either party to a contract to sell or a
sale is subject to any condition which is not performed, such party may
refuse to proceed with the contract or sale or he may waive perfor.
mance of the condition. If the other party has promised that the con-
dition should happen or be performed, such first mentioned party may
also treat the nonperformance of the condition as a breach of warranty.
22 85 Wash. 389, 392, 148 Pac. 43 (1915).
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(2) Where the property in the goods has not passed, the buyer may
treat the fulfillment by the seller of his obligation to furnish goods as
described and as warranted expressly or by implication in the contract
to sell as a condition of the obligation of the buyer to perform his
promise to accept and pay for the goods.
This section preserves the distinction between conditions and war-
ranties or other promises, and aims to avoid the confusion in this
difficult subject which is largely traceable to terminology. The Eng-
lish Act authorizes not only the waiver of a condition, but the election
to treat the breach of any condition to be fulfilled by the seller as a
breach of warranty This use of condition as including promise or
warranty is confusing and unfortunate. In the Sales Act the word
condition is never used in the sense of a promise.
The English Act treats a warranty as collateral to the main purpose
of the contract, the breach of which gives rise to a claim for damages
but not to a right to reject the goods and treat the contract as repudi-
ated. That is, the warranty is a promise, but the performance of the
promise is not a condition. Under the Sales Act the word is limited
to what is probably its essential meaning-a material promise. It is,
therefore, not necessary to determine under the Sales Act whether the
promise is or is not collateral, in either event the innocent party has
the right to rescind or repudiate the transaction. The opinion of Ellis,
J., in Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbzns,23 well illustrates the diffi-
culties involved. In that case the parties had entered into a
contract to sell cement subject to certain tests. It was found
that the provision for tests was a condition of the contract and
not a collateral warranty; that a collateral warranty placed the con-
sequences of a failure of the article to perform to the given standard
(survive the test) upon the seller, so that the purchaser's remedy
would survive his acceptance. On the other hand, it was found that
a condition would merely be precedent to acceptance, placing the con-
sequences of the failure to inspect or to make the test upon the pur-
chaser. It is suggested that the real question was whether or not
the seller had promised that the condition should happen or be per-
formed, if he had, it would make no difference under the Sales Act
whether collateral, direct, condition or warranty, for in the latter part
of subsection (1) it is expressly provided that non-performance of the
condition under circumstances may be treated as a breach of warranty,
and it is further provided in a later portion of the Sales Act, that in
23 79 Wash. 366, 374, 375, 140 Pae. 381 (1914).
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cases of breach of warranty, the buyer may accept the goods without
waiving the breach and recover damages for the non-performance. 24
See also the opinion of Morris, J., in Springfield Shingle Co. v.
Edgecomb Mill Co. 25  The often difficult question of determining
whether a promise is or is not collateral is thus obviated.
Obviously, the buyer's promise is impliedly conditioned on the per
formance by the seller of his promise and this is so provided in sub-
section (2)
Sec. I2. Definition of Express Warranty.
Any affirmation of fact or any promise by the seller relating to the
goods is an express warranty if the natural tendency of such affirma-
tion or promise is to induce the buyer to purchase the goods, and if
the buyer purchases the goods relying thereon. No affirmation of the
value of the goods, nor any statement purporting to be a statement of
the seller's opinion only shall be construed as a warranty.
On theory the fundamental basis for liability on warranty is the
justifiable reliance by the buyer on the seller's assertions. At common
law and under the English Act the meaning of warranty has not
always been clear and the line of division between express and implied
warranties has not been exact. The definition of an express warranty
under the Sales Act is one that is derived from the use of express
language. As to form, it may be either a promise or a representation.
The real test is-does the promise or affirmation or representation
(language used) of fact tend to induce the buyer to purchase the
goods and, further, does the buyer purchase the goods relying thereon.
Under such a test it is not the intent of the seller, but what the seller
says and the reliance of the buyer that are alone important. An early
case in Washington, Huntington v. Lombard,2 6 was the precedent for
later cases in holding that it was immaterial whether the representa-
tions by the seller were intended to be a warranty if the buyer did in
fact rely upon them.
The Act merely restates the law as to affirmation of value of opin-
ion not being construed as a warranty It is apparent that to justify
reliance the representation should be one of fact. The Washington
cases are in line with this part of the definition, varying occasionally
24 See. 69, Sales Act; Laws 1925, Ext. Sess., ch. 24, p. 385.
25 52 Wash. 6-20, 626, 101 Pac. 933 (1909).
2G 22 Wash. 202, 60 Pac. 414 (1900).
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on the difficult question of whether a particular representation is one
of fact or one of opinion.
2 1
As no distinction is made in the form of words used it is apparent
that words of description, as well as collateral representation, will
constitute an express warranty Most of the Washington decisions
seem to have been cases of description, but usually the descriptions
were used for the purpose of identification. When so used, while
included in the foregoing definition of an express warranty, the war-
ranty is rather an implied one in the sense that the promise is implied
that the goods will correspond with the description. Such warranties
are discussed under section 14, infra. In the case of specific goods, as
it is apparent the description is not used for the purpose of identifica-
tion, the warranty, if any, arising from the description, must be one
of character or quality and is, therefore, designated an express war-
ranty. Whether covered by section 12 or section 14, infra, the de-
scriptive statement upon which the buyer justifiably relies constitutes
the warranty.
28
It may be noted that the tendency of the courts has been distinctly
in the direction of greater strictness against sellers' statements, and
this seems commendable in view of the modern trend of business
towards higher and more exact standards.
Sec. 13. Implied Warranties of Title.
In a contract to sell or a sale, unless a contrary intention appears,
there is: (1) An implied warranty on the part of the seller that in case
of a sale he has a right to sell the goods, and that in case of a con-
tract to sell he will have a right to sell 'the goods at the time when
the property is to pass.
(2) An implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet
possession of the goods as against any lawful claims existing at the
time of the sale.
(3) An implied warranty that the goods shall be free at the time
of the sale from any charge or encumbrance in favor of any third
person, not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time when
the contract of sale is made.
(4) This section shall not, however, be held to render liable a
sheriff, auctioneer, mortgagee or other person professing to sell by
- See Northwestern Lumber Co. v. Callendar, 36 Wash. 492, '9 Pac. 30
(1904), Carver-Shadbolt Co. v. Loch, 87 Wash. 453, 151 Pac. 787 (1915), Smith
v. Bolster, 70 Wash. 1, 125 Pac. 1029 (1919).
28 See Tacoma Coal Co. v. Bradley, 02 Wash. 600, -7 Pac. 454 (1891) Kelly
v. Lum, 75 Wash. 135, 134 Pac. 819 (1913) Springfield etc. v. Edgecomb etc.,
59 Wash. 620, 101 Pac. 933 (1909), Caldwell Bros. v. Coast Coal Co., 58 Wash.
461, 108 Pac. 1075 (1910) Valentine v. Nebraska Bridge Co., 103 Wash. 129,
173 Pac. 744 (1918) Peterson v. Denny-Benton Coal Co., 89 Wash. 141, 154
Pac. 123 (1916), Huntington v. Lombard, 9 Wash. 202, 60 Pac. 414 (1900),
Jolly v. Blackwell, 122 Wash. 620, 911 Pac. 748 (1929).
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virtue of authority in fact or law goods in which a third person has a
legal or equitable interest.
As distinguished from express warranty an implied warranty is one
which arises from the transaction, usually irrespective of words and
not dependent on words. It should be noted that under the foregoing
provisions of the Sales Act that there is (1) a warranty not only of
a present right to sell, but of quiet enjoyment; and (2) the omission of
any requirement as to possession. Where the seller is in possession of
goods it has been uniformly held in the United States that a warranty
of title is implied. There are a few decisions and more dicta that
there is no warranty of title where the vendor is out of possession.
The weight of authority is against such a distinction. The Sales Act
by the omission of the requirement does away with this distinction.
This will at least relieve a doubt that may have arisen from several
decisions in Washington by implication. In Baker v. McAllister
29
the Court says: "It also clearly appears that at the time the lumber
was sold, it was in the possession of the defendant." In North
American Commercial Co. v. North American, etc.,30 the Court
says: "Moreover, the coal was in the constructive possession of ap-
pellant at the time of the sale, and the law, therefore, raises an impli-
cation of warranty of title." And, in Baker v. 8haw 31 the Court
says: "If A, being in possession of the property " These cases
apparently recognize possession as an important element.
As to subsection (2), there has been a controversy as to whether
the implied warranty of title should also include a warranty against
the disturbance of possession. The Sales Act settles this. The effect
of this provision would seem to be to give the buyer the right to pro-
ceed immediately though his possession was not disturbed, and if later
his possession was interfered with he could bring another action on the
implied covenant of quiet enjoyment and recover the damages which
he failed to recover in the first action.32
The rule expressed in subsection (3) was recognized in Baker v.
Shaw.3
Subsection (4) restates well settled rules. These agents are, how-
ever, liable for their actual representations. It may further be noted
29 -0 Wash. Terr. 48, 3 Pac. 581 (1880).
30 52 Wash. 502, 100 Pac. 985 (1909).
31 68 Wash. 99, 1-2-2 Pac. 611 (191-2).
32 1 WILLISTOW, SALES (2 ed. 1924) § 221.
33 68 Wash. 99, 101, 122 Pac. 611 (1919).
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that an agent in fact warrants his authority and may bind the prin-
cipal to a warranty so far as he acts within his authority.
Sec. 14. Implied Warranty in Sale by Description.
Where there is a contract to sell or a sale of goods by description,
there is an implied warranty that the goods shall correspond with the
description, and if the contract or sale be by sample, as well as by
description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods correspond
with the sample if the goods do not also correspond with the de-
scription.
This section expresses the well recognized law of Washington. See
Springfield, etc., v. Edgecomb, etc.,3 4 supra, and the other cases cited
under section 12, supra.
Words may be used (1) to describe the quality or condition of
goods sold or (2) to describe the goods bought for the purpose of
identification. The former are included in the definition of express
warranty. The latter are in a sense conditional to the buyer's obliga-
tion, as the buyer's obligation is impliedly conditional on performance
by the seller and the seller does not perform unless he tenders goods
of the description bought. If the seller has promised expressly that he
will deliver the described goods clearly there is an express warranty or
its equivalent. This section provides that even though not promised
expressly there is an implied promise to deliver goods according to
the description and in this sense there is an implied warranty. It is
thus definitely settled that the description entails obligation on the
seller and is more than a mere condition. This is clearly stated and
recognized in the case of Springfield Shingle Co. v. Edgecomb Mill
Co., supra. Used in this sense this section plainly~applies to goods
which are not specific. It does not provide for the warranty of
quality. Whether there may be an implied warranty of quality out-
side of description, such as fitness or merchantability, will depend upon
the provisions in sections 15 and 16. The obligation imposed upon
the seller who contracts to sell or make a sale by sample will be con-
sidered later. Obviously, such a sale should not exclude the usual
obligation imposed by a description when a description is used, as the
sample with the description by words makes the total description, the
sample as here used is merely an identification by a physical specimen
rather than by words.
3A Note 28, supra.
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Sec. 15. Implied Warranties of Quality.
Subject to the provisions of this act and of any statute in that
behalf, there is no implied warranty or condition as to the quality or
fitness for any particular purpose of goods supplied under a contract
to sell or a sale, except as follows: (1) Where the buyer, expressly
or by implication, makes known to the seller the particular purpose for
which the goods are required, and it appears that the buyer relies on
the seller's skill or judgment (whether he be the grower or manufac-
turer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
reasonably fit for such purpose.
(2) Where the goods are bought by description from a seller who
deals in goods of that description (whether he be the grower or manU-
facturer or not), there is an implied warranty that the goods shall be
of merchantable quality.
(3) If the buyer has examined the goods, there is no implied war-
ranty as regards defects which such examination ought to have re-
vealed.
(4) In the case of a contract to sell or a sale of a specified article
under its patent or other trade name there is no implied warranty as
to its fitness for any particular purpose.
(5) An implied warranty or condition as to the quality or fitness
for a particular purpose may be annexed by the usage of trade.
(6) An express warranty or condition does not negative a warranty
or condition implied under the act unless inconsistent therewith.
The provisions of the Sales Act are copies from the English statute
and the English statute was intended to express the common law of
England as it existed at the time the Act was passed. It may, there-
fore, be supposed that the liability of a seller under the Sales Act
will be somewhat greater than that imposed by the common law of
many jurisdictions of the United States.3 s According to the English
law (and also under the American Sales Act) the seller impliedly
warrants the merchantable character of the goods which he sells as
fully when he is merely a dealer in goods of that description as when
he is a manufacturer. 6 Accordingly, the distinction made in Hoyt v.
Hansworth Motor Co.37 between a manufacturer and a dealer is no
longer the law.
Subsection (1) is the only subsection under which a warranty of
a specific chattel can be implied. It applies to all sellers. It is based
on the fundamental principle of justifiable reliance. Whether the
warranty shall be implied in a given case is essentially a question of
35 1 W1LLISTON, SMES (0 ed. 1924) § 248.
36 1 WILLISTON, SALES (2 ed. 1924) § 233.
37 112 Wash. 440, 192 Pac. 918 (1920).
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fact. The words used are "particular purpose," and this raises the
question as to whether there may be the implication of a warranty of
merchantability and, if this may be inferred, the further question
whether the customary or usual use may not always be inferred as
the particular use in the absence of evidence otherwise. Liability
would, of course, depend on the further qualification in the section
that the buyer actually does rely on the seller's skill or judgment.
Williston says:
"In regard to subsection (1) some difficulty of construc-
tion has been felt. This is the only subsection under which a
warranty of a specific chattel can be implied and the question
has been raised-do the words of this subsection justify the
implication of a warranty of merchantability, or must the
words 'particular purpose' be held to indicate that the section
is not aimed at general merchantability but only at more specific
purposes? It would be unfortunate if the section should be
narrowly construed, and had it not already received a liberal
construction in England, a construction which it may be
assumed American courts would follow, it would be undesir-
able to copy the English legislation in this matter."38'
Benjamin says:
"A 'particular purpose' is not some purpose necessarily dis-
tinct from a general purpose, for example, the general purpose
for which all food is bought is to be eaten, and this would
also be the particular purpose in any specific instance. A
particular purpose is, in fact, the purpose, expressly or im-
pliedly communicated to the seller, for which the buyer buys
the goods; and it may appear from the very description of
the article, as, for example, 'coatings' or a 'hot-water bottle.'
But where an article is capable of being applied to a variety of
purposes the buyer must particularize the specific purpose he
has in view. The purpose for which the goods are required
need not necessarily appear in the contract itself, but may be
proved by evidence of matters ab extra the contract, even
when it is ih writing, if such evidence does not contradict the
contract. The purpose intended 'may be gathered from the
course pursued by the parties, and from their conduct and
acts and writings antecedent but leading up to the contract
itself.' "39
Cases bearing out this contention as to merchantability are Sampsoirn
v. Pals Co., 40 and Parker v. Shaghalian'4 1 each case holding this though
the goods were sold under a trade name.
31 Wx.uSor, SALES (e ed. 19.24) § 248.
: BEr.TAiri" ox S,%LMs (6 ed. English) 715-716.
40 192 N. Y. Supp. 538 (192-).
41244 Mass. 19, 138 N. E. 236 (1923).
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There are many cases in Washington recognizing that there may
be an implied warranty for a particular purpose and they do not
limit it to the manufacturer. 42
Subsection (2) provides for an implied warranty that the goods
shall be of merchantability in the sale of goods by description. Section
12 covers description as an express warranty when the description goes
to merchantability and section 14 covers the implied warranty of de-
scription for purposes of identification that the goods shall correspond
to the description. It is obvious that this might be possible and still
the goods might not be merchantable. The subsection, accordingly,
provides for the additional implied warranty that when goods are sold
by description they shall be of merchantable quality This is limited,
however, to dealers. Williston says:
"Though the terms of this subsection are confined to deal-
ers, it is not to be supposed that one who is not a dealer and
who contracts to sell goods by description to be furnished
in the future, can perform his contract by tendering un-
merchantable goods. It is only where the goods are actually
bought that subsection (2) is applicable."4
The section relates only to unspecified goods. This section changes
the rule as to the distinction suggested between manufacturers and
dealers in Hoyt v. Hainsworth Motor Co., supra, also recognized in
Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbns.4
Subsection (3) expresses the better view in regard to inspection.
Where inspection is had or may be had at the time the bargain is
made, the courts usually hold that the inspection precludes the exist-
ence of any implied warranty, regardless of whether the defect is
latent.4- This subsection limits the qualification to defects which the
examination ought to have revealed.46 It might be thought that the
subsection changes the law in that it refers only to examination and
says nothing of opportunity to examine, and, therefore, that the oppor-
tunity to examine is unimportant. It has been held, however, that the
buyer when given full opportunity to inspect has examined the goods
within the meaning of the Act.4 7  This makes the rule definite so far
42-Hauskem v. Hodson, 109 Wash. 606, 187 Pac. 319 (1920) Wapato Fruit
Co. v Denham, 126 Wash. 676, -19 Pac. 30 (1923) Long v. Five-Hundred Co.,
123 Wash. 347, 212 Pac. 559 (19-3) Little Co. v. Fynboh, 120 Wash. 595, 207
Pac. 1064 (1922) (a case of second hand goods).
43 1 WILLISrON, SALES (2 ed., 1924) § 248.
44 79 Wash. 361, 140 Pac. 394 (1914).
45 Springfield Shingle Co. v. Edgecomb Mill Co., 52 Wash. 620, 101 Pac. 233
(1909).
46 Hurley-Mason Co. v. Stebbins, note 44, supra, Ketchum v. Stetson. Mill
Co., 33 Wash. 92, 73 Pac. 1127 (1903).
47 Thornett v. Beers, (1919) 1 K. B. 486.
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as an implied warranty is concerned. Inspection will not preclude a
specific express warranty, although it might well preclude implications
in a general express warranty so far as the defects are obvious.
Subsection (4) is a restatement of the rule in regard to a known,
described, and defined article. It states the general rule.48 When
goods are to be identified by description and the buyer makes known
the particular purpose for which the goods are required, evidence that
the buyer asked for something by its patent or trade name would be
almost conclusive evidence that the buyer relied upon his own judg-
ment. This, however, should not prevent the buyer's reliance on the
fact that there may be merchantable articles under the trade name
in the sense that they are in fact what they purport to be and are not
worthless because of latent or hidden defects.
Subsection (5) lays down a rule contrary to that generally adopted
in the United States. It is, however, in accord with the English law
and the Sale of Goods Act. Evidence was admitted to deprive a
buyer of a warranty which would otherwise have been implied in
Seattle Seed Co. v. Fijimor. °50 The admissibility of usage or custom
for such a purpose involves no different question than the rule adopted
in the subsection.
Subsection (6) pronounces what seems to be the logical rule,
although it has been broadly stated that an express warranty in a
contract to sell or the sale necessarily excludes any implied warranty.
Obviously, if express warranties are in their nature inconsistent with
implied warranties it would be violating the parties' intentions to
imply such warranties. It is 'apparent, however, that if the seller
makes some express warranty it certainly ought not to exclude an
implied warranty that an article sold shall answer the description and
be fit for the purpose intended if these warranties, not being incon-
sistent, would otherwise be implied. This subsection brings the au-
thorities into accord. Of course, the parties may provide expressly
that there shall be no warranties, and when there is a complete
written contract of sale it is usually held that the parol evidence rule
excludes warranties not in the contract. It may be suggested that
this latter rule seems doubtful as to such warranties that arise regard-
less of intention or assent and are not, therefore, dependent on the
written contract.
48 Pentnsua Motor Co. v. Daggett, 126 Wash. 075, 218 Pac. 253 (19,23).
1 See Parker v. Shaghalin, 244 Mass. 19, 138 N. E. 236 (1923).
50 79 Wash. 123, 139 Pac. 866 (1914).
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SALE BY SAMPLE
Sec. 16. Implied Warranties in Sale by Sample.
In the case of a contract to sell or a sale by sample:
(a) There is an implied warranty that the bulk shall correspond
with the sample in quality.
(b) There is an implied warranty that the buyer shall have a rea-
sonable opportunity of comparing the bulk with the sample, except so
far as otherwise provided in section 47 (3).
(c) If the seller is a dealer in goods of that kind, there is an im-
plied warranty that the goods shall be free from any defect rendering
them unmerchantable which would not be apparent on reasonable ex-
amination of the sample.
The sample amounts to a representation and is in effect a short-
hand description. Subsection (a) recognizes this and the warranty
is implied that the bulk shall correspond with the description. This
is a warranty for the purpose of identity similar to the warranty in
sale by description discussed in section 14, supra.
Subsection (c) adds a warranty of quality in certain cases, that is,
where the sale is by a dealer, but not otherwise. This is the warranty
of merchantability, added just as the warranty of merchantability in
sales by description by dealers was added by subsection (2) in sec-
tion 15 not having been imposed by section 14.
The effect of section 16 is merely to provide specifically for the
implied warranties arising where samples are used for the purpose of
description.
Subsection (b) states a general rule discussed subsequently It merely
shows that the duty of the seller to afford the buyer an opportunity
for inspection is not dispensed with in sales by sample.
Leslie J Jyer
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